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EFFECT OF AMENDMENT EXTENDING PERIOD
OF PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS
By WILLIAM L. TRAvIS*
The enactment of Sec. 2052 Burns' Supplement, 1929, amend-
ing our former criminal limitations act by extending the time
for commencement of prosecutions for felonies from two to
five years has created a situation pregnant with uncertainty as
to the effect which such amendment has on offenses committted
prior to its passage.
Since the amending act changing the limitation period fails
to declare whether it should apply to past offenses a grave ques-
tion has arisen as to its effect. In the last analysis the question
resolves itself into an inquiry to determine the extent of power
reposed in the Legislature to enact, repeal or change limitation
acts, and, secondly, to discover what construction ought to be
placed on such an act where the intent of the lawmaker is not
made apparent by the act itself.
POWER OF THE STATE
The power of the State to prosecute at will is restricted by
the Legislature by the establishment of periods of limitation.
While the power to enact such statutes in the first instance is
unlimited, yet, after the exercise of its power to prescribe pe-
riods of limitation, it circumscribes its power thereafter to
change or repeal the original act. Before the full statutory
period has expired the limitation is a mere regulation of the
remedy subject to legislative control and it is generally conceded
that the Legislature has power to alter, repeal, or extend the
provisions of the original statute, and may by clearly expressed
intention make the statute operate retrospectively, without vio-
lating any constitutional rights of the accused.'
It has been intimated that the Legislature has power to re-
vive a crime previously barred and punish the offender there-
* Of the Hammond Bar.
'Rex v. Dharma, 2 K. B. 335; Com. v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506; State V.
Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp. 66; Wood, Limitation of Actions, Sec. 13; 12 C. J.
1103; Brill, Cyc. Crim. Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 195.
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for.2 But by the great weight of authority and better reason, it
is now well nigh the universal rule that after the lapse of the
statutory period the State has no power to revive its right to
prosecute.3 Some authorities base the rule upon the grounds of
public policy;4 others assign the prohibition against Ex Post
Facto laws as the basis for the rule.5 Wood, in his treatment of
the subject, expresses the opinion that perhaps the offender
cannot be said to have a vested right to his freedom by the
statutory lapse of time but that the State by its neglect to prose-
cute can be treated as having condoned the crime so that it is
estopped from prosecuting.8 Judge Dixon, in a well considered
opinion 7 states the Ex Post Facto theory so ably that we quote
him at length:
"The inalienable right to life and liberty is suspended during the
period within which the statute has to run; thereafter his title to liberty
and life becomes absolute and cannot be taken away under the constitu-
tional guaranty of the right to life and liberty * * * . After it has run
it is a defense not of grace, but of right, not contingent, but absolute and
vested, and like other defenses, not to be taken away by legislative enact-
ment * * *. The sanction of the law was dead and the Act of 1879,
restoring the expired law is within the spirit of the Ex Post Facto pro-
hibition and void.
"The impolicy of keeping crimes, not of the deepest dye, punishable
during the whole life of the offender, is sufficiently indicated by the com-
mon usage of civilized nations in fixing a period for the limitation of
criminal prosecutions. The beneficent aims of such a usage are thwarted
if the limitation be not absolute and irrevocable. The injustice and op-
pression of laws repealing the limitation, after persons have once relied
upon its finality, must be apparent to all. The innocent, conscious of acts,
which when only partly disclosed may seem criminal, preserve the evidence
of the whole truth until time has established the legal proof of innocence
by barring prosecution. Then their vigilance relaxes and their evidence is
lost. What more unjust than that now the Legislature should abate their
2 Bishop, Statutory Crimes, See. 266.
3 Moore v. State, 43 N. J. Law 203, 39 Am. Rep. 558; Peo. v. Lord,
12 Hun. 282; Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 61; State v. Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp.
66; Thompson v. State, 54 Miss. 740; Dinkerlocker v. Marsh, 75 Ind. 548
(dicta); Clark & Marshall, The Law of Crimes (2nd Ed.), Sec. 44; Wood,
Limitation of Actions, p. 33; Brill, Cyc. Crim. Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 195;
Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Pract., Sec. 316; 12 C. J. 222, 1103.
4 Moore v. State (supra); Wood, Limitations (4th Ed.), Vol. 1, Sec. 13.
5 Peo. v. Lord (supra); Thompson v. State (supra); State v. Sneed
(supra); Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Pract. Sec. 316; 12 C. J. 1103.
0 Wood, Limitations (4th Ed.), Vol. 1, Sec. 13.
7 Moore v. State (supra).
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protection and leave them to the hazard of half-discovered facts? A
guilty man, not wholly lost to honor and hope, passes through the statutory
period after his single offense, cowed by the constant dread of detection
and disgrace. Then, relieved from danger, he returns to the path of recti-
tude, forms respectable associations, and gathers around him those who
repose in his virtue and depend upon his fair name. Now the law changes,
the detective drags to light his long-buried crime; and innocent and guilty
alike are overwhelmed in the common ruin. It was of grace that remission
was granted; it is the spirit of injustice and oppression that withdraws it."
From the foregoing review it may readily be concluded that
our statute cannot apply to offenses against which the bar of
the old statute had run at time of its enactment.
It was argued in the Duffy 8 case that the Legislature had no
power to extend the limitation period for offenses against which
the full statutory time had not run, because it would alter the
rules of evidence and make less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense suffi-
cient to convict the accused. If the burden was upon the State
to show, in the one instance, that the alleged offense was com-
mitted less than two years prior to the commencement of prose-
cution, and, if the statute is changed and the State is then only
required to prove that the offense was committed less than five
years before the prosecution was commenced, it was argued that
the State would be able to convict upon less and different testi-
mony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense, thus violating the Ex Post Facto prohibition as defined
by the United States Supreme Court.9 The court, however,
answered the argument by saying that the extension of time
granted for prosecution changed the quantum but not the quality
of the evidence and did not therefore violate Article I of the
United States Constitution. Other than the Duffy case, we find
no case where this particular point has been raised.
As we have pointed out, the State may amend a limitation
statute so as to extend the time for commencement of presecu-
tion for offenses against which the full statutory time has not
expired, if the amendment clearly manifests the intent of the
Legislature to make it operate retroactively. Nothing is indi-
cated by our statute as to its application, so we are concerned
not so much with a question of power as we are one of intent,
to be determined by certain rules of statutory construction.
s Com. v. Duffy, supra, N. 1.
9 Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 386; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221.
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II.
CONSTRUCTION: PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE OPERATION?
It is a fundamental rule in civil actions that statutes of limi-
tation will not be given a retroactive effect unless it clearly ap-
pears that the Legislature so intended.' 0 Likewise, it is a funda-
mental rule of criminal jurisprudence that limitation statutes
should be liberally construed in favor of the accused and against
the prosecution."
Wharton 1 2 says:
"A mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitation in
criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation
in civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially differ-
ent. In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an im-
partial arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of
the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either
party. Neither grants the right to the other, and there is therefor no
question as against whom the ordinary presumptions of construction are
to be made.
"But it is otherwise when a statute of limitations is granted by the
State. Here the State is the grantor surrendering, by act of grace, its
right to prosecute, and ordering the offense to be no longer the subject of
prosecution.
"The statute is not a process to be strictly and grudgingly applied, but
an amity, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the
offense and that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country,
and that henceforth he may cease to preserve proofs of his innocence, for
the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limita-
lo Peo. v. Cohen, 245 N. Y. S. 419, 157 N. E. 515; Hickson v. Darlow,
52 Law J., Ch. 454; Bedford v. Shilling, 4 Serg. & R. 400-408; Charles 'V.
Lamberson, 1 Ga. 435; State u. Connell, 43 N. J. Law 106; Edelstein v.
Carlisle, 33 Colo. 54, 78 P. 680; Trapnel v. Burton, 24 Ark. 371; Thompson
v. Alexander, 11 Ill. 54; Lewis v. Brackenridge, 1 Blackf. 220; Hopkins v.
Jones, 22 Ind. 310; Nicklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289, 20 N. E. 797;
Henderson v. State, 96 Ind. 437; Wood, Limitation of Actions, 33; 37 C. J.
681; 16 C. J. 222; 36 C. J. 1212, 1213; 17 R. C. L. 682, Sec. 28.
n Peo. v. Lord, 12 Hun. 282; State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 468, 82 S. W.
12; State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S. E. 401, 403; State v. Heller, 76
Wis. 517, 45 N. W. 307; Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 614; State v. Fulkerson,
182 P. 725 (Okla.); Moore v. State, supra, N. 3; Wood, Limitation of
Actions, Chap. 1, p. 28, Sec. 11; Wharton, Crim. Plead & Pract. (9th Ed.),
Sec. 316; Bishop, Statutory Crimes (3rd Ed.), Sec. 259; Brill, Cyc. Crim.
Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 195; 16 C. J. 222.
12 Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Pract. (9th Ed.), Sec. 316.
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tion are to be liberally construed in favor of defendants, not only because
such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amity and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification
by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs
of innocence, has assigned to it a fixed and positive period in which it
destroys proofs of guilt."
An exhaustive search discloses a paucity of cases wherein
the courts have actually decided whether an act such as our own
operates retrospectively. In Pennsylvania1 3 and Texas 14 the
rule seems to be that where a statute of limitations is extended,
a defendant, in whose favor the original statute had not fully
run at the time of the change, may be prosecuted within the
newly established time, although the time of the old limitation
period has expired at the commencement of prosecution. On
the other hand, it is the rule in New York,15 and apparently
followed in Oklahoma,1 6 that where no reference is made to past
offenses, an extension of a limitation period only applies to those
committed subsequent to the change, thus applying the rule that
obtains in civil cases. The New York rule is supported not only
by the better reason, but by all the finer traditions of the law
because a bare resolution in the mind of the Legislature without
manifesting itself in some audible manner ought never to be
given any consideration in arriving at the construction to be
placed upon its act. Furthermore, we must assume that if they
could have spoken in unequivocal terms and did not, their failure
to do so should be taken as an indication that they did not in-
tend to include that which was omitted. That few cases have
been reported in which such a statute's retroactive operation has
been involved is probably due to the fact that trial courts and
prosecutors have shared the opinion that a sense of justice
compelled them to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused.
Moreover, in the course of practical events, there would be few
cases where the extension of time would be resorted to because
in modern times the State, as a rule, either moves swiftly to
prosecute, or abandons the notion altogether.
Since there are no records at the Indiana Legislative Refer-
ence Bureau to enlighten us, we can only hazard a guess as to
1 Com. v. Duffy, supra, N. 1.
14 State v. Sneed, 251 Tex. Supp. 66.
15 Peo. v. Lord, supra, N. 3.
16 State v. Fulkerson, supra, N. 11.
EFFECT OF AMENDMENT
the purpose of the legislators in changing the old law. At that
time a certain public official high in the ranks of his party relied
upon the old statute as a defense to a prosecution, and it must
have been impressed upon the Legislature that under the two-
year statute, more than ample time was allowed a public servant
during his last two years to conceal the corruption of his first
two years in office, so that at the end of his four years term,
he would be immune from prosecution by his successors in office.
No one will question the wisdom of the five-year limitation pe-
riod, but by the insertion of a few words, the Legislature may
have saved us the apprehension which provoked us to undertake
this research to determine what should be done with the half-
dissected body which they left on the operating table.
CONCLUSION
Without a Statute of Limitations a State has power to prose-
cute at will. In the exercise of its good common sense it recog-
nizes the wisdom of establishing a limitation period in order
to prod its public officers to strict application to duty, to free
the innocent from the oppression of false accusations, and to
afford the guilty an opportunity to reform.
When the State relinquishes its right, and establishes an
arbitrary period of limitations declaring that after a certain
time the suspended sword of Damocles shall be lifted from the
head of the suspected citizen, it makes a solemn bargain with
the innocent as well as the guilty which it is morally bound to
observe. The State becomes burdened with a duty to commence
prosecution within a certain time, and as a corollary, the ac-
cused has the right to be prosecuted within the same prescribed
period; it cannot be otherwise, because there cannot be a duty
without a corresponding right.
If the State toys with its duty, becomes an Indian giver and
calls back unto itself that which it has given, how can such an
example impress upon the accused his moral duty to henceforth
conduct himself in a manner above suspicion? What security
does he have that there remains a locus poenitentiae where he
may reform, if that period of repentance and redemption is sub-
ject to removal farther and farther from his grasp? What hope
does he have of reaching the goal of a new era, where bygones
are buried in the past and life may be begun anew? If the State
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may once change the limitation period by extending the time
for commencement of prosecution, it is logical to presume that
before the extension of time has expired it may again extend
the time, then again and again, hounding the victim of its
viciousness to his grave. It would be evil enough for an uncon-
scionable Legislature to break its solemn promise; but if the
Legislature be not so bold as to run the gauntlet of criticism
for failure to keep its faith, then the judiciary ought not step in
where the legislators feared to tread and supply by construction
what the latter chose to evade.
Once the beneficent hands of grace have stretched forth to
give remission from sin and erase the pains of oppression from
the innocent, they ought never again be outstretched except to
embrace the persecuted and the penitent recipients of their
favor.
In the light of the fundamental rules of statutory construc-
tion, in the face of the silence of the Legislatures as to its pur-
pose, and upon the basis of sound logic and the weight of author-
ity, we submit that the Limitation Act of 1929 relating to
criminal offenses has no application to offenses committed before
its enactment.
PROGRAM MIDWINTER MEETING,
JANUARY 16, 1932
All sessions at Claypool Hotel, Indianapolis.
MORNING
Meetings of committees on call of chairmen.
Meeting Board of Managers, 10:00 A. M.
AFERNOON
Association convenes at 1:30 P. M.
Reports of Committees:
Membership.
Jurisprudence and Law Reform.
Legal Education.
American Citizenship.
Addresses: "Lest We Forget"--Hon. James A. Van OsdoI.
Criminal Jurisprudence.
Grievances.
Legislation.
Endowment of Law Journal.
Illegal Practice of Law.
Reorganization of Bar.
(Order of these reports subject to rearrangement.)
Miscellaneous Business.
EVENING
Banquet at 6:30 P. M., in Riley Room.
Speaker: Hon. Julius Henry Cohen, New York City.
Subject: Illegal Practice of Law.
Guests: Officers of Indiana Bankers' Association.
Members are permitted to bring their banker friends as
their guests. Dinner tickets $1.50. Please notify secretary
promptly number of tickets.
